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The Cost of Allowing the Public to Enjoy the Lake of the Ozarks: 
Should Landowners Be Protected Over the Public? 




In Anderson v. Union Electric Company, the Missouri Supreme Court 
reviewed the Missouri’s Recreational Use Act (“RUA”).2 The highly 
anticipated decision held that Union Electric Company (“UE”), the majority 
owner of the Lake of the Ozarks (“the Lake”), was not responsible for the 
death of the Anderson children when a stray electrical current stemming from 
their parents’ dock killed them.3 The court held that because the Lake 
allowed the public to use the facilities without paying an admission fee, the 
Lake was not liable under the RUA.4 The court rejected the Anderson’s 
argument that the fee they paid for permission to have a dock on their 
property constituted a fee under the statute.5 As such, the Lake was not held 
liable.6  
While the Missouri courts have rarely addressed the statute,7 this case 
highlights the problems with the RUA as it is currently drafted. The statute 
was drafted with a well-intentioned policy rationale of “encourage[ing] the 
free use of land for recreational purposes in order to preserve and utilize 
[Missouri] natural resources.”8 But the legislature has created a statute that 
allows large companies and organizations to escape liability through the fine 
parsing of the term “charge” in the statute. Therefore, either the legislature 
should alter the RUA or the Missouri courts should alter their interpretation 
                                                
1 463 S.W.3d 783 (Mo. 2015). 
2 Anderson v. Union Elec. Co., 463 S.W.3d 783, 784-85 (Mo. 2015) [hereinafter Anderson 
II]. 




7 Missouri courts have only reviewed the RUA on two occasions, other than Anderson. 
8 Foster v. St. Louis County, 239 S.W.3d 599, 601 (Mo. 2007). 
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of the RUA. These changes would incentivize UE, the party with the most 
control, to place additional requirements on docks at the Lake to ensure the 
public is safe from stray electrical currents. This note will outline why the 
Missouri Supreme Court should have decided the case differently and why 
the Missouri legislature should change the statute so that the burden of 
protecting the public is placed on the party with the most resources.  
First, this note will set forth the facts of the case where the Missouri 
Supreme Court determined that the Lake was not responsible for the 
Andersons’ children’s death. The second part will examine the historical 
context of the RUA in Missouri and highlight alternative Recreational Use 
Statutes from other states. Third, this note will lay out the Missouri Supreme 
Court’s rationale for the case. The fourth section will describe how the 
court’s decision was in line with Missouri precedent and how the court could 
have distinguished past cases so that the Andersons could proceed with their 
case. Lastly, this note will suggest possible ways the Missouri legislature 
could change the statute to prevent these types of incidents in the future.  
II. FACTS AND HOLDING 
Angela Anderson and her husband (“Andersons”) own a home on the 
Lake of the Ozarks (“the Lake”).9 The Lake is manmade and connected to the 
Bagnell Dam; both are owned and operated by Union Electric Company 
(“UE”).10  The original purpose of the dam was to supply the area with 
hydroelectricity.11 Now, thousands have built homes around the Lake and 
even more visit “the Lake’s scenic beauty and recreational allure.”12 
Additionally, many of the homeowners around the Lake have docks, giving 
their homes direct access to the Lake.13 In order for a homeowner to build a 
dock, he or she must submit an application, including written plans for the 
                                                
9  Anderson II, 463 S.W.3d at 784-85; Anderson v. Union Elec. Co., No. WD76927 2014 
Mo. App. WL 2574628, at *2 (Mo. App. W.D. June 10, 2014) [hereinafter Anderson I]. 
10 Anderson II, 463 S.W.3d at 784.  
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13 Lake News Online, Higher Court Rules Against Ameren in Lawsuit Over Electrocution 
Deaths, OZARKS FIRST (June 19, 2014, 2:03 PM), http://www.ozarksfirst.com/news/appeal-
court-rules-against-ameren. 
THE COST OF ALLOWING THE PUBLIC TO ENJOY THE OZARKS 
252 
 
dock, to UE.14 After review, UE grants the homeowner a permit for the dock 
or other structure in return for an annual fee.15  
UE’s permit program places certain “requirements for these 
improvements, including requirements regulating the manner in which 
landowners may supply electricity to their docks.”16 However, UE does not 
“require dock owners to install [ground fault interrupt devices] as a condition 
of obtaining a dock permit.”17 
The Andersons built a dock on the Lake, supplied it with electricity, 
but did not use a ground fault interrupt device, so as to “prevent injury in the 
event of an electrical fault.”18 In July 2012, Alexandra and Brayden, the 
Andersons’ two children, were swimming in the Lake near their dock when a 
stray electrical current from the Andersons’ dock killed the children.19 The 
Andersons then filed a wrongful death suit against UE arguing that UE 
negligently caused the death of their children.20 UE asked the court to dismiss 
the case under Mo. Rev. Stat. § 537.346.21 The trial court agreed with UE, 
dismissing the case for failing to state a claim because UE is immune from 
liability under The Recreational Use Act22 (“RUA”).23 
                                                
14 Application for an Ameren Missouri Permit, AMEREN, https://www.ameren.com/-
/media/missouri-site/Files/lakeoftheozarks/lakeapplication.pdf. 
15 Anderson II, 463 S.W.3d at 784-85. 
16 Id. at 785. 
17 Id.  
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
20 Anderson II, 463 S.W.3d at 785; Anderson I, No. WD76927, 2014 Mo. App. WL 2574628, 
at *1. 
21 Id. “Except as provided in sections 537.345 to 537.348, and section 537.351, an owner of 
land owes no duty of care to any person who enters on the land without charge to keep his 
land safe for recreational use or to give any   general or specific warning with respect to any 
natural or artificial condition, structure, or personal property thereon.” Anderson II, 463 
S.W.3d at 786. 
22 Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 537.345-537.348 (2012). (“As used in sections 537.345 to 537.347, and 
section 537.351, the following terms mean: (1) “Charge”, the admission price or fee asked 
by an owner of land or an invitation or permission without price or fee to use land for 
recreational purposes when such invitation or permission is given for the purpose of sales 
promotion, advertising or public goodwill in fostering business purposes; (2) “Land”, all real 
property, land and water, and all structures, fixtures, equipment and machinery thereon; 
(3) “Owner”, any individual, legal entity or governmental agency that has any ownership or 
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However, the Missouri Court of Appeals Western District disagreed.24 
The court held that the trial court erred in dismissing the Andersons’ 
complaint.25 Specifically, it found that the fee the Andersons’ paid fit under 
the “charge” definition of RUA and therefore UE did not have immunity.26 
The case was then appealed to the Missouri Supreme Court.27 The supreme 
court reversed the Missouri Court of Appeals and upheld the trial court’s 
opinion.28 Ultimately, the Missouri Supreme Court determined that when an 
individual is injured on publicly accessible property, and a fee is not charged, 
the landowner is not liable and protected under the RUA.29  
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Each state has a statute that shields a landowner from liability when 
he or she grants access to the public for recreational purposes.30 The purposes 
of these statutes are to encourage landowners to open up their property for 
public use and to give the public greater access to the natural beauty of the 
outdoors.31 Collectively, such legislation is referred to as recreational use 
                                                                                                                     
security interest whatever or lease or right of possession in land;  (4) “Recreational use”, 
hunting, fishing, camping, picnicking, biking, nature study, winter sports, viewing or 
enjoying archaeological or scenic sites, or other similar activities undertaken for recreation, 
exercise, education, relaxation, or pleasure on land owned by another; ….. (d) Any non-
covered land. “Non-covered land” as used herein means any portion of any land, the surface 
of which portion is actually used primarily for commercial, industrial, mining or 
manufacturing purposes; provided, however, that use of any portion of any land primarily for 
agricultural, grazing, forestry, conservation, natural area, owner’s recreation or similar or 
related uses or purposes shall not under any circumstances be deemed to be use of such 
portion for commercial, industrial, mining or manufacturing purposes.”). Id.  
23 Anderson II, 463 S.W.3d at 786; Anderson I, No. WD76927 2014 Mo. App. WL 2574628, 
at *2. 
24 Anderson I, No. WD 76927 2014 Mo. App. WL 2574628, at *1. 
25 Id. at *3.   
26 Anderson II, 463 S.W.3d at 785; Anderson I, No. WD76927 2014 Mo. App. WL 2574628, 
at *2-3. 
27 Id. 
28 Anderson II, 463 S.W.3d at 786. 
29 Id. at 790.  
30 Harris M. Pittman, The Arkansas Recreational-Use Statute: Past, Present, and Future 
Applications for Arkansas Landowners and Recreational Users of Land, 60 Ark. L. Rev. 
849, 849 (2008). 
31 Id.  
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statutes.32 A recreational use statute allows a landowner to escape liability for 
injuries occuring on recreational land except for instances of gross 
negligence33 or if an individual pays money in return for using the land.34 
Most of the statutes have vastly different standards for the latter exception.35 
Missouri’s standard is “an admission price or fee,”36 whereas other states 
have a standard simply requiring “consideration.”37  
A. Missouri’s Recreational Use Statute History 
In the seminal case of Genco v. Connecticut Light and Power Co., 
Laura Genco dove into Candelwood Lake, owned by Connecticut Light and 
Power Company (“Company”), and struck the bottom of the lake. 38 Genco 
argued that the Company should have warned swimmers about the depth of 
the water or should have ensured that the water levels were sufficient so that 
divers would not be injured.39 The Company argued it was protected from 
liability because the lake is open to the public.40  The Appellate Court of 
                                                
32 Id. 
33 States differ in the standard of negligence required to make landowners liable for an 
individual injury: “willful or malicious” Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 41.510, “malicious or grossly 
negligent” Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 105.672.  
34 Id.  
35 Id. 
36 Anderson II, 463 S.W.3d at 785; Anderson I, No. WD76927, 2014 Mo. App. WL 2574628, 
at *3. 
37Ducey v. United States, 713 F.2d 504, 510 (9th Cir. 1983). 
38 Genco v. Conn. Light & Power Co., 7 Conn. App. 164, 165 (Conn. App. 1986). 
39 Id. at 165. 
40 The statute is almost verbatim to the Missouri statute. Defendants argue the lake would be 
considered open to the public based on the following statutory language: “Sec. 52-
557g. Liability of owner of land available to public for recreation; exceptions. (a)   Except as 
provided in section 52-557h, an owner of land who makes all or any part of the land 
available to the public without charge, rent, fee or other commercial service for recreational 
purposes owes no duty of care to keep the land, or the part thereof so made available, safe for 
entry or use by others for recreational purposes, or to give any warning of a dangerous 
condition, use, structure or activity on the land to persons entering for recreational purposes. 
(b)   Except as provided in section 52-557h, an owner of land who, either directly or 
indirectly, invites or permits without charge, rent, fee or other commercial service any person 
to use the land, or part thereof, for recreational purposes does not thereby: (1) Make any 
representation that the premises are safe for any purpose; (2) confer upon the person who 
enters or uses the land for recreational purposes the legal status of an invitee or licensee to 
whom a duty of care is owed; or (3) assume responsibility for or incur liability for any injury 
to person or property caused by an act or omission of the owner. (c)   Unless otherwise 
 
JOURNAL OF ENVTL. & SUSTAINABILITY LAW VOL. 22, NO. 2 
 
255 
Connecticut agreed with the Company.41 The court found that Genco was not 
charged a fee for entering the lake and the lake was generally available to the 
public, even if portions of the lake were restricted in access.42 Missouri courts 
have relied on this case in their decisions regarding Missouri’s RUA. 
Missouri’s first opportunity to review the RUA came in Wilson v. 
United States.43 In Wilson, a member of the Boy Scouts of America, went on 
a trip to Fort Leonard Wood with his troop.44 During the trip, some of the 
boys, including Wilson, discovered irrigation piping stacked next to the cabin 
where the troop was sleeping.45 The boys carried the pipe away from the 
cabin, where they raised the pipe so it stood almost straight up in the air and 
came in contact with electrical lines.46 All of the boys were shocked, but 
Wilson was the only boy to die from his injuries.47 Wilson’s parents brought 
a wrongful death suit against the United States (“Fort”).48  
The Fort argued it was not liable for Wilson’s death because it had 
immunity from damages because of the RUA.49 The parents argued the Fort 
was not shielded from immunity for three reasons.50 First, the boys were 
charged two dollars to stay in the cabins, which equated to a fee under the 
RUA exceptions.51 Second, the Fort received an economic gain from 
allowing the Scouts to stay overnight.52 Third, Wilson died on “non-covered 
land.”53 The Eighth Circuit rejected the parents’ arguments and found that the 
                                                                                                                     
agreed in writing, the provisions of subsections (a) and (b) of this section shall be deemed 
applicable to the duties and liability of an owner of land leased to the state or any subdivision 
thereof for recreational purposes.” Con. Gen. Stat. § 52. 
41 Genco, 7 Conn. App. at 168. 
42 Id. at 169-72. 
43 Wilson v. U.S., 989 F.2d 953 (8th Cir. 1993). 









53 Id. Parents also argued, “the Boy Scouts were not members of the ‘general public,’ and 
thus were not covered by the Act”…. and “the United States negligently failed to protect 
against an ultra hazardous condition.” Id. 
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Fort was immune from liability because it was shielded by the RUA.54 
Specifically, the court held that the two dollar fee was not an entrance fee, 
but rather for staying overnight in the cabin.55 Therefore, the fee did not 
constitute a charge under the RUA.56 Additionally, the court held that the fee 
covered the cost of “maintaining and equipping the facility” and so the Fort 
did not receive an economic gain.57 Therefore, the Fort’s cabin does not 
constitute “non-covered land.”58 Following Wilson, Missouri courts were 
silent on further explanation of the RUA for 14 years.  
The Missouri Supreme Court once again had to address the definition 
of “charge” in Foster v. St. Louis County.59 In that case, Foster was injured 
while playing football in a local park.60 The park is open to the public and 
fees are only charged for tours and use of picnic tables.61 However, Foster 
did not participate in either of these activities.62 Foster sued the city, who 
owned and operated the park, for damages resulting from his injuries.63 
Foster argued the park was considered “non-covered land” because it was 
used for commercial use as evidenced by the fees required for the tours and 
picnic areas; therefore the park should not be shielded from liability under the 
RUA.64 The Missouri Supreme Court rejected Foster’s argument and held 
that the park did not qualify as “non-covered land” because the park had few 
activities that required paying a fee.65 Specifically, the Court found that the 
park did not charge a fee for access to the area where Foster was playing 
football and therefore could not be used “primarily for commercial 
purposes.”66 
 
                                                
54 Id. at 958. 
55 Id. at 956. 
56 Id. at 957. 
57 Id. at 956, 958. 
58 Id. at 958. 
59 Foster v. St. Louis County, 239 S.W.3d 599 (Mo. 2007). 
60 Id. at 600. 
61 Id. at 600-01. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 601. 
64 Id. at 601-02. 
65 Id. 
66 Id.  
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B. Different State’s Interpretations of Recreational Use Statutes 
The Ninth Circuit addressed Nevada’s Recreational Use Statute67 in 
Ducey v. US.68 In Ducey, three people enjoyed a day at the Lake Mead 
National Recreational Area (“LMNRA”).69 Lake Mead is maintained by the 
National Park Service (“NPS”) but allows the Eldorado Canyon Resorts, Inc. 
(“Resorts”)70 to operate a store, refueling stations, trailer rentals, and boat 
docks.71 Neither NPS nor Resorts require an entrance fee to use the 
LMNRA.72 In September 1974, a flash flood swept through the Lake Mead 
area killing three people inside the recreational area.73 The families of the 
                                                
67 NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41.510(1) (West 2015) provides that: 
“Except as otherwise provided in subsection 3, an owner of any estate or interest in any 
premises, or a lessee or an occupant of any premises, owes no duty to keep the premises safe 
for entry or use by others for participating in any recreational activity, or to give warning of 
any hazardous condition, activity or use of any structure on the premises to persons entering 
for those purposes…. (a) Limit the liability which would otherwise exist for: 
(1) Willful or malicious failure to guard, or to warn against, a dangerous condition, use, 
structure or activity. 
(2) Injury suffered in any case where permission to participate in recreational activities was 
granted for a consideration other than the consideration, if any, paid to the landowner by the 
State or any subdivision thereof. For the purposes of this subparagraph, the price paid for a 
game tag sold pursuant to NRS 502.145 by an owner, lessee or manager of the premises shall 
not be deemed consideration given for permission to hunt on the premises. 
(3) Injury caused by acts of persons to whom permission to participate in recreational 
activities was granted, to other persons as to whom the person granting permission, or the 
owner, lessee or occupant of the premises, owed a duty to keep the premises safe or to warn 
of danger.” 
68 Ducey v. U.S., 713 F.2d 504 (9th Cir. 1983).  
69 Id. at 507.  
70 While Resort is required to pay the NPS a percentage of the sales made off of retain 
spaces, including the boat dock and trailer rental area, the year of the accident Resort did not 
make any payments to the NPS. It is unclear in the Anderson case if the retail spaces located 
around the Lake pay a fee to Ameren or if they are allowed to operate on the Lake free of 
charge. In either case, the payment from the retail space to the governmental or state owner 
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deceased filed a lawsuit against the NPS and Resorts for failing to warn 
against the pending flood.74 
The NPS argued they were immune from liability under Nevada’s 
recreational use statute because there was no consideration for entering the 
LMNRA, or alternatively, if there was consideration, it was not paid to the 
NPS but to Resorts.75 The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument, holding that 
the government’s interpretation of consideration was too constrictive.76 First, 
the court contrasted the definition of consideration with the more narrow 
terms “fee or charge” and relied on the inherently broad nature of the term 
consideration.77 Second, the court concluded that it did not matter to whom 
the consideration was paid to as long as that entity had the “power to grant or 
deny permission to participate in recreational activities.”78 Lastly, the court 
relied heavily on the policy rationale that when “a landowner derives an 
economic benefit from allowing others to use his land for recreational 
purposes, the landowner is in a position to post warning, supervise activities, 
and otherwise seek to prevent injuries.”79 As such, the NPS could not avoid 
liability under the Nevada’s recreational use statute.80 
In Plano v. City of Renton, the petitioner used the city’s lake and 
mooring area.81 The city charges either a fee for every night a boat is moored 
overnight, or allows an individual to pay an annual fee for the ability to use 
the boat launch.82 The petitioner moored her boat for free one night and then 
paid for her boat to be moored a second night.83 On her way to her boat, she 
                                                
74 Id. at 508. 
75 Id. at 509-10. 
76 Id. at 510.  
77 Id. The Ninth Circuit looked to Black’s Law Dictionary for the definition of 
Consideration: “a term of art, a word with a well-understood meaning in the law, embracing 
any right, interest, profit or benefit.” Id. 
78 Id. at 513. 
79 Id. at 511.  
80 Id. at 514-15. The 9th Circuit also noted that “if the United States itself had operated [the 
same type of property the Resort operated] the purchases by the [deceased individuals] 
would constitute ‘consideration’ in return for permission to recreate in [the LMNRA] within 
the meaning of consideration exception to the Nevada statute.” Id. at 512. 
81 Plano v. City of Renton, 103 Wash.App. 910 (WA App. 2000). 
82 Id. at 912. 
83 Id. at 913. 
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slipped and fell on the metal ramp connecting the moor to the shore.84 The 
petitioner sued the city, which argued that it had immunity because of a 
recreational use statute.85 Washington’s recreational use statute protects 
landowners from liability unless a fee is charged.86 The city claimed the moor 
was generally available to the public, and the ramp where the petitioner was 
injured did not require an access fee.87 The court concluded that because the 
petitioner paid to access the location where her injury occurred, the city could 
not avoid liability.88 Further, the court agreed with the trial court’s conclusion 
that while the petitioner did not pay for the use of the ramp itself, the ramp 
where the injury occurred was a “necessary and integral part” of the dock 
where petitioner paid to moor her boat.89  
IV. INSTANT DECISION 
In the instant case, the Missouri Supreme Court found the Western 
District Court of Appeals erred in finding UE was not liable under the 
                                                
84 Id. at 911. 
85 Id.  
86 Id.; see also WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.210(1) (West 2016) (“Except as otherwise 
provided in subsection (3) of this section, 1 any public or private landowners or others in 
lawful possession and control of any lands whether designated resource, rural, or urban, or 
water areas or channels and lands adjacent to such areas or channels, who allow members of 
the public to use them for the purposes of outdoor recreation, which term includes, but is not 
limited to, the cutting, gathering, and removing of firewood by private persons for their 
personal use without purchasing the firewood from the landowner, hunting, fishing, 
camping, picnicking, swimming, hiking, bicycling, skateboarding or other non-motorized 
wheel-based activities, hang gliding, paragliding, the riding of horses or other animals, clam 
digging, pleasure driving of off-road vehicles, snowmobiles, and other vehicles, boating, 
nature study, winter or water sports, viewing or enjoying historical, archaeological, scenic, or 
scientific sites, without charging a fee of any kind therefor, shall not be liable for 
unintentional injuries to such users).  
87 Plano, 102 Wash. App. at 913-14. 
88 Id. at 915. 
89 Id. The court also noted that “[t]he reason why the two ramps and the connecting 
gangways exist is to provide access to the floating dock, a fee-generating portion of the park. 
An overnight moorage patron cannot even pay the required moorage fee without walking up 
one of the ramps, including the one on which Plano fell. These facts establish that the ramp 
where the injury occurred is in the recreational area for use of which Renton charges a fee.” 
Id.  
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RUA.90   On appeal, the Andersons raised two issues, both of which the 
Missouri Supreme Court rejected.91  
First, the Andersons did not dispute that this case fell under the 
RUA.92 Instead, the Andersons contended that in this case, UE is not 
protected against liability because the Andersons paid a “use fee” to UE for 
the dock permit and the right to access the lake, which they argue is a 
“charge” under the RUA.93 The court disagreed; finding that the fee the 
Andersons paid UE for the dock permit did not constitute a “charge” under 
the RUA.94 The court relied on three cases,95 all of which ruled that the 
landowners were not liable for injuries occurring on the land when the fee 
was incidental to being on the land.96   
The court ruled that the dock permit fee did not constitute an 
admission fee, and therefore was not a “charge” under the RUA.97 In fact, the 
Andersons admitted that their children were allowed to enter the Lake at any 
time and were not required to pay a fee to UE each time they entered the 
Lake.98  The ruling turned on the conclusion that “[w]hat matters is not where 
or how the children entered the Lake, but whether UE imposed a charge for 
that entry.”99 The court concluded that the dock permit fee pertained only to 
the Andersons’s ability to build a dock and did not have any bearing on the 
Andersons’s ability to enter the Lake.100 Therefore, the permit fee was not an 
                                                
90 Anderson II, 463 S.W.3d at 790.The case is reviewed de novo and “when a landowner is 
entitled to immunity under the RUA, the trial court has no discretion and must dismiss the 
petition under Rule 55.27(a)(6).” Id. at 786. 
91 Id.  
92 Id. at 787. 
93 Id.  
94 Id. at 788; see also Mo. Rev. Stat. § 537.345 (emphasis added) (“Charge: the admission 
price or fee asked by an owner of land or an invitation or permission without price or fee to 
use land for recreational purposes when such invitation or permission is given for the 
purpose of sales promotion, advertising or public goodwill in fostering business purposes.”). 
95 Anderson II, 463 S.W.3d at 787-89; Wilson v. United States, 989 F.2d 953 (8th Cir. 1993); 
Genco v. Connecticut Light and Power Co., 1 Conn.App. 164 (1986); and Foster v. St. Louis 
County, 239 S.W.3d 599 (Mo. 2007). 




100 Id. at 787-88. 
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admission fee.101 As such, the Court held that the Court of Appeals erred 
because the RUA gives immunity to the UE. The Andersons’ claim was 
dismissed.102 
The Andersons also argued that UE is not entitled to liability 
protection under the RUA because the dock is “uncovered land,” which is an 
exception under the statute.103 The court also rejected this argument.104 The 
Andersons argued that they are entitled to the exception because UE 
primarily uses the banks of the Lake for business and docks; therefore those 
profits transform it into commercial purpose.105 However, the Court pointed 
out that the Eighth Circuit in Wilson specifically rejected this argument.106 
Additionally, the UE cannot make a profit from the permit fees.107 The UE’s 
operation license explicitly states that the UE can charge for dock permits “if 
the use is ‘consistent with the purpose of protecting and enhancing the scenic, 
recreational, and other environmental values.’”108 Based on this license, the 
court concluded UE had the permit fees, not for commercial reasons, but “to 
recover the cost of its permit program.”109 Therefore, the “non-covered land” 
exception for liability under the RUA did not apply to the Andersons’s 
case.110 
The dissent determined that the permit fee was a charge under the 
RUA.111 Unlike the majority opinion, the dissent argued that the statute 
should be strictly construed.112 Additionally, the dissent distinguished the 
cases brought up by the majority because they dealt with temporary uses of 
                                                





106 Id. at 789 (holding “that a landowner does not necessarily use the property primarily for 
commercial purpose under … merely because the owner charges fees for things other than 
admission”.). 
107 Id. at 790. 
108 Id. 
109 Id.  
110 Id. (quoting MO. REV. STAT. § 537.348(3)(d) (2016)). 
111 Id. at 791 (Teitelman, J. dissenting). 
112 Id. at 790-91 (Teitelman, J. dissenting). 
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property, unlike the Andersons’s case, where the permit fee “grants private 
access to the land owner and his or her guests.”113 
V. COMMENT 
The Missouri Supreme Court was partially correct in determining that 
that Andersons’s dock did not constitute non-covered land. However, the 
court was incorrect in ruling that the dock permit fee did not constitute a 
“charge” under the RUA. Since the court has interpreted “charge” very 
narrowly, the onus is on the Missouri legislature to change the RUA’s 
definition of “charge" to ensure property owners are incentivized to protect 
the public. 
The statutory definition of non-covered land is explicit. The statute 
states that recreational areas are not considered “non-covered land,” and 
recreational land by definition cannot be commercial.114 As the court points 
out, this directly contradicts the Andersons’s argument.115  Furthermore, if 
the Lake was used primarily as commercial land, then UE would be in direct 
violation of its permit to operate the Lake.116 On this point at least, the court 
was correct to reject the Andersons’s argument.117  
However, the Court was incorrect in determining that the Andersons 
did not pay a “fee.” Instead, the Appellate Court and the dissent were correct 
when they held UE liable under the RUA. The statute makes a landowner 
liable if they charge an admission price or if they charge a fee. In this case, 
                                                
113 Id. at 791 (Teitelman, J. dissenting). 
114 MO. REV. STAT. § 537.345 (2016). “Noncovered land as used herein, means any portion 
of any land, [that is used] primarily for agricultural, grazing, forestry, conservation, natural 
area, owner's recreation or similar or related uses or purposes shall not under any 
circumstances be deemed to be use of such portion for commercial, industrial, mining or 
manufacturing purposes. Id. (emphasis added). 
115 Anderson II, 463 S.W.3d at 789. 
116 The FERC license specifically provides that UE can collect fees to cover the operating 
costs but that UE’s primary purpose is to protect the land encompassing the Lake and its 
shoreline. Id. (quoting Coalition for Fair & Equitable Regulation of Docks on Lake of the 
Ozarks v. F.E.R.C., 297 F.3d 771, 775 (8th Cir. 2002). 
117 Additionally, other Missouri cases have held that the Lake and the Dam are separate. See 
Lonergan v. May, 53 S.W.3d 122 (Mo. App. 2001) (holding that under the RUA, land can be 
divided into different parts with different primary purposes, and therefore, the Dam can be 
primarily commercial without transforming the surface and surrounding land of the Lake into 
primarily commercial property). Id. at 129-33. 
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the Andersons were not charged an admission price but they were charged a 
fee — a dock permit fee. According to Black’s Law Dictionary, a fee is “a 
charge or payment for labor or services.”118  Based upon the definition of fee, 
the Andersons did make a payment to UE in return for the approval of their 
dock permit. Therefore, based upon the definition of “fee,” the Missouri 
Supreme Court should have reversed the lower court’s decision to grant UE 
summary judgment and remanded the case back to the lower court.  
The Andersons’s case is also distinguishable from both Genco v. 
Connecticut Light and Power Company 119and Foster v. City of St. Louis.120 
In Genco, the injured individual did not pay any type of fee for using the 
premises.121 Further, the Genco landowners did not charge anything on the 
premises.122 This is an entirely different situation than the instant case 
because the Andersons did pay a fee and individuals paid for other items 
around the Lake, such as boat rentals.  
Additionally, Foster can be distinguished from the case at hand 
because the injured individual did not pay a fee to be on the premises, even 
though the park did charge fees for the use of other areas in the park.123 
Foster was not using the areas in the park that required a use fee.124 In 
contrast, the Andersons were using their dock, which required a dock permit 
fee. The Anderson children would not have been injured if the dock was not 
on the premises because there would not have been a stray electrical current.  
The instant case is further distinguishable from Genco and Foster 
because in neither case did the landowners regulate the use of a manmade 
addition to the property as UE regulates the docks on the Lake. The Company 
in Genco allegedly violated the RUA because it failed to adequately warn the 
public of a danger, and in Foster the allegation was a failure to ensure the 
                                                
118 Fee, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).  
119 Genco v. Conn. Light & Power Co., 7 Conn. App. 164, 165 (Conn. App. 1986). 
120 Foster v. St. Louis County, 239 S.W.3d 599 (Mo. 2007). 
121 Genco, 7 Conn. App. at 170. 
122 Anderson II, 463 S.W.3d at 786; Anderson I, No. WD76927, 2014 Mo. App. WL 
2574628, at *1. 
123 Foster, 239 S.W.3d at 602. 
124 Id.  
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park was without holes.125 These allegations are different than the claims in 
the present case. UE was already aware that the Andersons’s dock existed. In 
fact, it both reviewed and approved the dock. It failed to ensure that the dock 
was safe for the dock owners and the public at large. With their approval 
authority, UE took upon itself the responsibility to ensure swimmers safety in 
regards to dangers posed by docks. 
Wilson also can be distinguished from the Andersons’ case. First, in 
Wilson, the building the Boy Scouts were staying in, and had paid to use, did 
not injure the Scouts.126 Instead, the Scouts moved items from one location 
on the property closer to electrical lines and then raised a very large pipe, 
which eventually came into contact with the line.127 In contrast, the Anderson 
children did not take any affirmative steps to cause their deaths; the injury 
came from the manmade structure the Andersons had paid for and had UE’s 
permission to build.  
In addition, the cases are different because of the amount of money 
exchanged in return for using the land. In Wilson, the two-dollar fee was 
considered incidental, used for “maintaining and equipping the facility,” and 
only entitled the payor to use the cabin.128 This fee did not allow visitors to 
touch or use the pipes. However, when the Andersons paid money to UE, 
they were paying specifically to build and use the dock, which included 
entering the Lake through the dock, which caused the injury. This is the most 
distinguishing factor, and should entitle the Andersons to a different outcome 
under Wilson. 
Alternatively, the Missouri Supreme Court could change its 
interpretation of “fees.”  For example, the court could have taken its approach 
from Plano. The Plano court found there was an implied charge to use the 
boat ramp to access the moor, which the plaintiffs paid to use.129 The court 
reasoned that “the metal ramp where Plano fell is a necessary and integral 
part of the moorage.”130 Like Plano, the Andersons paid for permission to 
build a dock, thereby giving the Anderson children an access point to the 
                                                
125 See Genco, 7 Conn. App. at 508; Foster, 239 S.W.3d at 600. 
126 Wilson v. U.S., 989 F.2d 953, 955 (8th Cir 1993). 
127 Id. 
128 Id. at 956. 
129 Plano v. City of Renton, 102 Wash.App. 910, 911 (WA App. 2000).  
130 Id. 
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Lake. The Missouri Supreme Court could have found, like in Plano, that the 
dock was an integral part of the Andersons’s property and the best way for 
them to enter the Lake.  
Some may argue that the children could have entered the Lake 
without using the dock, just like other Lake property owners who do not have 
a dock. While this is true, the fact that but for the dock, the injury would not 
have occurred removes this argument. The dock does not have to be the only 
way to access the Lake. In Plano, theoretically, there were many ways to 
access the boats, but the plaintiff accessed the boat by way of a ramp, which 
then caused the injury.131 In the instant case, the Anderson children died 
because the way they accessed the Lake was not properly regulated by UE 
and therefore caused a dangerous situation, which ultimately killed both 
children. Had the UE required an in-person inspection, included a clause 
detailing the requirements for properly grounding wires for docks, or 
required additional permits from another entity that would inspect the 
electrical grounding, the Anderson children probably would not have died. 
Therefore, when the Andersons paid for the ability to build a boat dock, they 
paid a fee to enter the Lake, making UE liable for injuries resulting from the 
dock.  
The best solution to the problem that arose in the Andersons’s case 
would be for the Missouri legislature to amend this statute to better protect 
the public. Specifically, the legislature should adopt a standard similar to 
Nevada’s recreational use statute as illustrated in Ducey.132 The standard in 
Ducey was “consideration,” which is broader than Missouri’s current 
standard.133 If the Missouri Supreme Court had applied this standard, UE 
would have been liable for the Anderson children’s deaths. Following the 
Ducey court’s reasoning, UE is in the best position to ensure that the docks 
are electrically grounded and are safe for swimmers, and thus should be 
responsible for any damages arising out a dock’s malfunction.  
Some may argue that the holding in Deucy cannot be adopted because 
the company in Deucy makes a profit from the land, which is why the court 
                                                
131 Id. 
132 Ducey v. U.S., 713 F.2d 504 (9th Cir. 1983). 
133 Id. 
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decided it was in the best position to regulate safety. While UE does not 
make a profit from fees generated by approving dock permits, the fact that it 
charges a fee still places it in the best position to regulate safety. UE already 
requires homeowners to get approval for docks on the Lake and charges a fee 
for the administrative costs of approving dock construction plans.  Therefore, 
it logically follows that UE could pass on, to the dock owners, the 
administrative costs of ensuring a dock’s electricity is grounded. 
Additionally, because UE has to approve the docks before they are built, it is 
in the best position to ensure the docks are safe for dock users and the people 
swimming nearby.  
Others may, nonetheless, argue that the additional requirements 
would place too much of a burden on UE. This argument is unpersuasive 
because UE now, after the Anderson childrens’ death, requires an additional 
permit, inspections, and fee for the ability to run electricity to an individual’s 
dock.134 UE now specifically requires adherence to specific instructions for 
grounding wires, which probably would have saved the Anderson children.135 
Clearly, the UE had the ability to require proper grounding before the 
Anderson children died, without any additional costs. This shows that 
requiring private companies, like UE, to ensure safety is not unreasonable.  
Landowners who open up their property for public use should be 
incentivized to ensure safety. Yes, they cannot be required to know about 
everything. There is no suggestion that UE “close the lake for maintenance or 
police the area for hazards, such as floating objects and submerged tree 
trunks, and the owner cannot possibly protect people from the risks inherent 
in water sports.”136 It would be unreasonable to hold the park liable for not 
knowing about the hole the defendant injured himself on in Foster. Nor is it 
suggested that companies be liable for the actions of rambunctious boys who 
engineer a way to hurt themselves as in Wilson.  Additionally, while the 
death of the Andersons’ children is tragic, if this were a one-time occurrence 
it would be reasonable to equate this to an act of God, which UE could not 
have foreseen. Unfortunately, this is not the only time this type of death has 
occurred. In fact, this is one of many occurrences where stray electrical 
                                                
134 Ameren, Dock Electrical Installations, https://www.UE.com/missouri/lake-of-the-
ozarks/dock-electrical-installations. 
135 Id. 
136 Lonergan v. May, 53 S.W.3d 122, 132 (Mo. App. 2001). 
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currents from non-grounded outlets on docks have injured or killed 
swimmers at the Lake.137 The Lake is the only party that can put a stop to 
these types of injuries.  
Therefore, this note suggests that an organization, with complete 
control over who can build docks and the sole power to regulate what can or 
cannot be on a dock, has an inherent duty to keep people safe when it can. 
The Lake has been charged with keeping the environment safe while 
allowing the public to enjoy nature. However, the public cannot enjoy the 
beauty of the Lake if they are going to die from stray electrical currents 
because UE did not specifically require in the dock permits that dock owners 
should secure electricity running to the docks under UE’s supervision.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
Anderson v. Union Electric Company represents Missouri’s continued 
support of landowners over the safety of individuals. In this case, the 
Missouri Supreme Court could have departed from precedent, distinguished 
past cases, expanded the definition of “charge,” or changed Missouri’s 
interpretation of the Recreational Use Act. Alternatively, the court should 
have found that past cases had not adequately defined what a “fee” was and 
remanded the case to the lower court for trial. However, the question is not 
whether the Missouri Supreme Court made the right decision in this case, but 
whether the law itself is correct. The Missouri legislature needs to decide if 
the desire to make recreational land more open for public enjoyment 
overrides the need to keep the public safe on the recreational land.  The RUA 
should be amended to encourage people to enjoy the wonderful recreational 
offerings of Missouri, but it should also hold the UE responsible for obvious 
potential injuries to visitors, because the company is in the best position to 
address these safety issues.  
                                                
137 Quick & Geisler, One Killed, One Injured Following Electric Shock at the Lake of the 
Ozarks, ABC 17 NEWS (June 22, 2015), http://www.abc17news.com/news/one-killed-one-
injured-following-electric-shock-at-the-lake-of-the-ozarks/33713150. 
